Vague Value

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):352-372 (2013)
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You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations

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Tom Dougherty
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


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