Scientific Models

Philosophy Compass 6 (11):757-764 (2011)
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Abstract
This contribution provides an assessment of the epistemological role of scientific models. The prevalent view that all scientific models are representations of the world is rejected. This view points to a unified way of resolving epistemic issues for scientific models. The emerging consensus in philosophy of science that models have many different epistemic roles in science is presented and defended
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Archival date: 2014-07-31
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2011-11-11

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