There’s Something About Authority

Journal of Philosophical Research 46:363-374 (2021)
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Abstract

Barz contends that there is no specification of the phenomenon of first-person authority that avoids falsity or triviality. This paper offers one. When a subject self-ascribes a current conscious mental state in speech, there is a presumption that what she says is true. To defeat this presumption, one must be able to explain how she has been led astray.

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Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton

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