Cognitive disability and embodied, extended minds

In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. OUP (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we think about cognitive impairment and rehabilitation, how cognitive reserve mitigates neural impairment, and the distinction between medical and social models of disability.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DRACDA-3
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-10-16
Latest version: 2 (2019-02-02)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-10-16

Total downloads
96 ( #21,605 of 37,180 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
96 ( #3,345 of 37,180 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.