Cognitive disability and embodied, extended minds

In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford: OUP (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we think about cognitive impairment and rehabilitation, how cognitive reserve mitigates neural impairment, and the distinction between medical and social models of disability.

Author Profiles

Andy Clark
University of Sussex
Zoe Drayson
University of California, Davis


Added to PP

831 (#12,506)

6 months
100 (#20,600)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?