Changes in attitude

Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169 (2021)
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I formulate and tentatively defend the view that we cannot be rationally required to have one type of doxastic attitude (e.g., beliefs, credences, imprecise credences, etc.) because we have another type; in other words, we can only be required to have, say, given credences because we have some other credences already. I explore an argument that appeals to the idea that there is no good reasoning from one type to the other type. I consider some important possible responses, and conclude by sketching a different argument for the same conclusion, appealing to the nature of inquiry and belief-formation.

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Daniel Drucker
University of Texas at Austin


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