Changes in Attitude

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I formulate and tentatively defend the view that we cannot be rationally required to have one type of doxastic attitude (e.g., beliefs, credences, imprecise credences, etc.) because we have another type; in other words, we can only be required to have, say, given credences because we have some other credences already. I explore an argument that appeals to the idea that there is no good reasoning from one type to the other type. I consider some important possible responses, and conclude by sketching a different argument for the same conclusion, appealing to the nature of inquiry and belief-formation.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DRUCIA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-10-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-10-07

Total views
27 ( #60,672 of 2,448,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #24,510 of 2,448,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.