Potentiality Arguments and the Definition of “Human Organism”

American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):33-34 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Bettina Schöne-Seifert and Marco Stier present a host of detailed and intriguing arguments to the effect that potentiality arguments have to be viewed as outdated due to developments in stem cell research, in particular the possibility of re-setting the development potential of differentiated cells, such as skin cells. However, their argument leaves them without an explanation of the intuitive difference between skin cells and human beings, which seems to be based on the assumption that a skin cell is merely part of a human organism, while an embryo is at some point a human organism. An appropriately designed concept of the human organism can explain the difference, but also has the potential of re-dividing the argumentative landscape along familiar lines.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DUFPAA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-04-19
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-01-12

Total views
423 ( #12,147 of 55,862 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #26,570 of 55,862 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.