An Argument for Dualism from the Lived Experience of Time

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Abstract
Temporal passage is an irrefragable and ineliminable feature of our lived experience of time. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of whether one adopts a three-dimensional, A theory of time or a four-dimensional, B theory of time, the subject of lived experience of time has to be conceived of as something that stands outside of the physical order in order for the experience of temporal passage to actually occur. This implies the truth of Dualism as the only account of mind that can accommodate the facts of the lived experience of time.
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Archival date: 2018-05-15
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2018-05-15

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