The Consequences of Neurophysiological Materialism

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Abstract
In this essay, I argue that neurophysiological materialism - the thesis that all of our mental contents are caused by non-mental, purely physical brain states - is epistemically self-refuting, and ought to be rejected even if it cannot be otherwise disproved.
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DUNTCO-6
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Archival date: 2011-03-10
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2011-03-10

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