Abstract
Although an advantage commonly claimed for selected effects theories of function lies in their ability to eschew a problem of liberality that alternative theories allegedly face, they also face their own liberality problem. This problem is classically illustrated by Mark Bedau’s case of clay crystals, which seem apt to undergo a kind of natural selection, and also, more recently, by Justine Kingsbury’s example of rocks differentially persisting on a beach, discussed by Justin Garson in relation to his generalized selected effects theory. In this paper, I will be concerned with another type of case that illustrates this liberality problem: whole organisms. Although we may be reluctant to consider whole organisms as potential function bearers, they seem uncontestably subject to a selection process (i.e. natural selection), such that selected effects theories seem prima facie committed to ascribing them functions. I will use the case of whole organisms to comparatively assess two influential responses to the liberality problem faced by selected effects theories: the service response, which introduces the requirement that selected effects functions result from selection for a contribution to a complexly organized system, and the population response, which restricts selected effects functions to effects that result from selection processes operating on populations of the appropriate type. I will argue that, although the latter response has been preferred in Garson and others’ recent discussions of selected effects theories, the case of whole organisms shows the superiority of the former. Selected effects functions arise not from selection simpliciter, but from selection for service.