Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection

Proceedings of Tark XI (2007)
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Abstract

Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge that underlies the new require- ment provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamson’s and Halpern’s.

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Julien Dutant
King's College London

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