Causal structuralism, dispositional actualism, and counterfactual conditionals

In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--99 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EAGCSD
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-11-26
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists.Randolph Clarke - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):323-331.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
470 ( #4,670 of 37,097 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #26,166 of 37,097 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.