Causal structuralism, dispositional actualism, and counterfactual conditionals

In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--99 (2009)
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Abstract
Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.
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2009-01-28

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