Location and perdurance

In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5. Oxford Univerity Press. pp. 53-94 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmoreā€™s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.
Reprint years
2015
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EAGLAP
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-11-26
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
962 ( #3,297 of 51,672 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
73 ( #6,878 of 51,672 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.