Location and perdurance

In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5. Oxford Univerity Press. pp. 53-94 (2010)
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Abstract
Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmoreā€™s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.
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Multilocation and Mereology.Kleinschmidt, Shieva

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2009-01-28

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