A New Philosophical Tool in the Meno: 86e-87c

Ancient Philosophy 33 (1):75-96 (2013)
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I argue that the technique Socrates describes in the Meno at 86e-87c allows him to make progress without definitions, even while accepting that definitions are necessary for knowledge. Some contend that the technique involves provisionally accepting a claim. I argue, instead, that it provides a secure biconditional that one can use to reduce the question one cares care about to a new question that one thinks will be easier to answer.

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David Ebrey
Universitat de Barcelona


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