Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EDDIAH
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-08-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-12-16

Total views
286 ( #23,255 of 2,454,407 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #54,247 of 2,454,407 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.