Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics

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Abstract
The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another
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ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EDDTAF
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Archival date: 2018-08-04
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2010-08-06

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