Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objection
E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 23 (2):37-41 (2016)
Abstract
This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2016
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EDWRVU
Upload history
Added to PP index
2016-10-04
Total views
380 ( #13,758 of 55,947 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #26,032 of 55,947 )
2016-10-04
Total views
380 ( #13,758 of 55,947 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #26,032 of 55,947 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.