Debunking a mereological myth: If composition as identity is true, universalism need not be

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is a common view that if composition as identity is true, then so is mereological universalism (the thesis that all objects have a mereological fusion). Various arguments have been advanced in favour of this: (i) there has been a recent argument by Merricks, (ii) some claim that Universalism is entailed by the ontological innocence of the identity relation, (or that ontological innocence undermines objections to universalism) and (iii) it is entailed by the law of selfidentity. After a preliminary introduction to the competing theories of persistence (necessary for a discussion of Merricks’ argument) I examine each in turn and demonstrate how they fail. I conclude that the prejudice that if composition as identity is true then Universalism is true, is unwarranted. Thus one motivation for believing Universalism is lost and those who believe composition as identity should now be receptive to some form of restricted composition.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EFFDAM
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-07-26
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
84 ( #48,636 of 64,194 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #42,174 of 64,194 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.