Rejecting The Publicity Condition: The Inevitability of Esoteric Morality

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):29-57 (2013)
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It is often thought that some version of what is generally called the publicity condition is a reasonable requirement to impose on moral theories. In this article, after formulating and distinguishing three versions of the publicity condition, I argue that the arguments typically used to defend them are unsuccessful and, moreover, that even in its most plausible version, the publicity condition ought to be rejected as both question-begging and unreasonably demanding
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