Dynamic absolutism and qualitative change

Philosophical Studies:1-11 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to Fine’s famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EKEDAA
Revision history
First archival date: 2020-02-20
Latest version: 2 (2020-02-20)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Objective Becoming.Skow, Bradford
Mctaggart’s Paradox.Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2020-02-19

Total views
35 ( #45,433 of 49,996 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #18,196 of 49,996 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.