Should moral intuitionism go social?

Noûs 57 (4):973-985 (2022)
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Abstract

In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult normative and meta‐normative questions for theorists of all stripes.

Author Profiles

Marvin Backes
University of Cologne
Matti Eklund
Uppsala University
Eliot Michaelson
King's College London

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