Confession of a causal decision theorist

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
(1) Suppose that you care only about speaking the truth, and are confident that some particular deterministic theory is true. If someone asks you whether that theory is true, are you rationally required to answer "yes"? (2) Suppose that you face a problem in which (as in Newcomb's problem) one of your options---call it "taking two boxes"---causally dominates your only other option. Are you rationally required to take two boxes? Those of us attracted to causal decision theory are under pressure to answer "yes" to both questions. However, it has been shown that many existing decision theories are inconsistent with doing so (Ahmed 2014). A simple proof shows that the same goes for an even wider class of theories: all "suppositional" decision theories. The moral is that causal decision theorists must either answer "no" to one of the above questions, or else abandon suppositional decision theories.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ELGCOA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-04-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-04-29

Total views
91 ( #42,600 of 59,018 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
91 ( #7,224 of 59,018 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.