Problems for Propositions


This paper consists of an investigation of three debates concerning propositional identity: the tension between structured propositions and higher-order logic, the principle Only Logical Circles, and Kaplan’s Paradox. The literature at large has mistaken the consequences of each of these debates. Structuralists are not committed to the claim that identical properties have different extensions; rather, they are committed to existence monism. Only Logical Circles does not preclude the identification of green in terms of grue; some further (and, as of yet, undisclosed) principle is required for that result. And Kaplan’s Paradox does not count against the possible-worlds conception of propositions; it applies to every account of propositions whatsoever.

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Samuel Elgin
Yale University


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