Moral Kombat: Analytic Naturalism and Moral Disagreement

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral naturalists are often said to have trouble making sense of inter-communal moral disagreements. The culprit is typically thought to be the naturalist’s metasemantics and its implications for sameness of meaning across communities. The most familiar incarnation of this metasemantic challenge is the Moral Twin Earth argument. We address the challenge from the perspective of analytic naturalism, and argue that making sense of inter-communal moral disagreement creates no special issues for this view.

Author Profiles

Edward J. R. Elliott
University of Leeds
Jessica Isserow
University of Leeds

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-05-15

Downloads
82 (#90,175)

6 months
82 (#57,205)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?