The “New Mind” revisited, or minding the content/vehicle distinction: a response to Manzotti and Pepperell

AI and Society 28 (4):461-466 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications of the New Mind

Author's Profile

Andreas Elpidorou
University of Louisville

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-06-01

Downloads
982 (#17,941)

6 months
167 (#20,283)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?