Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle

Utilitas 26 (1):51-60 (2014)
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John Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty
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First archival date: 2013-08-22
Latest version: 2 (2013-09-17)
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A More Plausible Collapsing Principle.Andersson, Henrik & Herlitz, Anders

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