Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3):259-267 (2019)
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In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new 'reduction' argument against nonreductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his 'simple moral theory' version of the argument doesn’t rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

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Luke Elson
University of Reading


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