Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals

Journal of Philosophy (5):276-287 (2014)
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Abstract
In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The difficulty undermines Fine's reasons for preferring exact semantics to possible worlds semantics.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EMBCWP
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First archival date: 2014-07-21
Latest version: 3 (2014-10-17)
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2014-07-21

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