Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals
Journal of Philosophy (5):276-287 (2014)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The difficulty undermines Fine's reasons for preferring exact semantics to possible worlds semantics.
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2014
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0022-362X
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EMBCWP
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2014-07-21
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2014-07-21
Total views
1,121 ( #3,245 of 56,943 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #17,375 of 56,943 )
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