Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding

David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre

Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103 (2021) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 85-103, October 2021.

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Author Profiles

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Open University of Israel

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Archival date: 2021-07-17
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Categories

Evidence and Proof in Law in Philosophy of Law

Fetishism in Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality

Legal Ethics in Applied Ethics

Legal Reasoning and Adjudication in Philosophy of Law

Keywords

intrinsic and non-intrinsic value knowledge fetishism system design legal theory legal Epistemology

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DOI

10.1111/phis.12203

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