Abstract

Most interpretations of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature emphasize its theoretical aspects, often limiting the debate to whether it should be understood as what I term philosophia contra scientiam or philosophia ancilla scientiae. Challenging this focus, I highlight the equally metatheoretical and metapractical dimensions in Hegel’s comprehending approach to nature, proposing that the Philosophy of Nature seeks to comprehend—and indeed rank—nature’s intrinsic value through the lens of the Concept, ascribing to it truth and freedom. My central thesis is that Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature provides an environmental metaethics that avoids both physiocentric and anthropocentric biases, instead establishing a ‘Concept-centric’ perspective on environmental ethics that proposes respecting natural beings for their own sake and according to their distinct constitutions, for reasons akin to those by which we respect humans. This has far-reaching ethical implications, especially pertinent to today’s systematic debates on environmental ethics, in view of the urgent environmental challenges we are confronted with.