Intentional attribution and rationality: A critical reading of Dennett’s Intentional Attribution Program

Revista Filosofía Uis 15 (1) (2016)
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In this paper I introduce some of the key elements of Daniel Dennett’s theory of intentional attribution and their relation with his notion of rationality. While doing so I will show that Dennett’s approach implies a circularity in the process of attribution of rationality, and that his resource to evolutionary arguments for trying to avoid an infinite regress does not help him to avoid the problem. My presentation will include a revision of Dennett’s arguments for epistemic intentional ascription and rationality attribution as well as some criticisms developed against his proposal. At the end of the article I will extend the criticisms and present my view about his proposal for ideal rationality attribution.
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Archival date: 2020-09-11
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