Principles of Indifference

Journal of Philosophy 116 (7):390-411 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The principle of indifference states that in the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational agent will distribute their credence equally among all the possible outcomes under consideration. Despite its intuitive plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. In this article, I present a novel rehabilitation of PI in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgments. In particular, I consider two natural comparative reformulations of PI and argue that while one of them prescribes the adoption of patently irrational epistemic states, the other provides a consistent formulation of PI that overcomes the most salient limitations of existing formulations.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EVAPOI
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-08-11
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-08-11

Total views
32 ( #36,577 of 41,546 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #19,088 of 41,546 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.