Street on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons

Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676 (2015)
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Abstract
Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity
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First archival date: 2015-03-05
Latest version: 2 (2015-03-24)
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