Abstract
Argument from analogy is a common and formidable form of reasoning in
law and in everyday conversation. Although there is substantial literature
on the subject, according to a recent survey ( Juthe 2005) there is little fundamental
agreement on what form the argument should take, or on how
it should be evaluated. Th e lack of conformity, no doubt, stems from the
complexity and multiplicity of forms taken by arguments that fall under
the umbrella of analogical reasoning in argumentation, dialectical studies,
and law. Modeling arguments with argumentation schemes has proven
useful in attempts to refine the analyst’s understanding of not only the
logical structures that shape the backbone of the argument itself, but also
the logical underpinning of strategies for evaluating it, strategies based on the semantic categories of genus and relevance. By clarifying the distinction between argument from example and argument from analogy, it is
possible to advance a useful proposal for the treatment of argument from
analogy in law.