Denial of Responsibility and Normative Negation

In Cariani (ed.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. Springer (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I provide some linguistic evidence to the thesis that responsibility judgments are normative. I present an argument from negation, since the negation of descrip- tive judgments is structurally different from the negation of normative judgments. In particular, the negation of responsibility judgments seem to conform to the pattern of the negation of normative judgments, thus being a prima facie evidence for the normativity of responsibility judgments. I assume — for the argument’s sake — Austin’s distinction be- tween justification and excuse, and I sketch how to accommodate the distinction between internal (justification) and external (excuse) nega- tion of responsibility within a language with a second-order analogous of existential generalization and λ operator. In the end I confront with and refute some objections against this argument.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FARDOR-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-09-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-09-23

Total views
482 ( #9,228 of 52,929 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #10,999 of 52,929 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.