Know-how and non-propositional intentionality
In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: pp. 95-113 (forthcoming)
Abstract
This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.
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Archival date: 2018-08-23
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2018-08-23
Total views
237 ( #21,974 of 55,904 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #15,898 of 55,904 )
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