Know-how and non-propositional intentionality

In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: pp. 95-113 (forthcoming)
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This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.
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Know How.Stanley, Jason
Knowing How.Stanley, Jason & Williamson, Timothy
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan

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