- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Know-how and non-propositional intentionality
In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-113 (2018)
Abstract
This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.Author's Profile
Analytics
Added to PP
2018-08-23
Downloads
469 (#21,630)
6 months
46 (#37,102)
2018-08-23
Downloads
469 (#21,630)
6 months
46 (#37,102)
Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?
