Know-how and non-propositional intentionality
In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: pp. 95-113 (forthcoming)
Abstract
This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.
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Archival date: 2018-08-23
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References found in this work BETA
Know How.Stanley, Jason
The Concept of Mind.Ryle, Gilbert
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan
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2018-08-23
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146 ( #23,047 of 44,449 )
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60 ( #11,866 of 44,449 )
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