Phenomenal intentionality without compromise

The Monist 91 (2):273-93 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FARPIW
Revision history
Archival date: 2011-03-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality.Peter Clutton & Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,219 ( #1,457 of 41,654 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
135 ( #3,072 of 41,654 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.