Shifting sands: An interest relative theory of vagueness

Philosophical Topics 28 (1):45--81 (2000)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I propose that the meanings of vague expressions render the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing them sensitive to our interests. For example, 'expensive' is analyzed as meaning 'costs a lot', which in turn is analyzed as meaning 'costs significantly greater than the norm'. Whether a difference is a significant difference depends on what our interests are. Appeal to the proposal is shown to provide an attractive resolution of the sorites paradox that is compatible with classical logic and semantics.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FARSSA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2010-11-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.

View all 83 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-04-06

Total views
3,489 ( #381 of 46,475 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
296 ( #1,307 of 46,475 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.