The open-endedness objection against sophisticated dispositionalism

Perspectiva Filosófica 41 (1):49-56 (2014)
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Abstract
Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by sophisticated dispositionalism is not viable. My goal in this paper is to argue that the open-endedness objection is flawed.
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Archival date: 2016-07-17
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References found in this work BETA
Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
[Omnibus Review].Loewer, Barry
Naturalizing Content.Boghossian, Paul A.

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