Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration

Ethics 131 (2):183-206 (2020)
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Abstract
Potential perspectivism is the view that what an agent ought to do (believe, like, fear, … ) depends primarily on facts that are potentially available to her. I consider a challenge to this view. Potentially accessible facts do not always agglomerate over conjunction. This implies that one can fail to have relevant access to a set of facts as a whole but have access to proper subsets of it, each of which can support different incompatible responses. I argue that potential perspectivism has no unproblematic answer to the question of what the agent ought to do (believe, like, fear, … ) in such circumstances.
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Archival date: 2021-03-19
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