The moral obligations of trust

Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):332-345 (2014)
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Abstract
Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ?all the way down?. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ?all the way down?
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Archival date: 2014-09-18
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The Cunning of Trust.Pettit, Philip

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Epistemology Personalized.Benton, Matthew A.

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2014-08-29

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