Attention Is Amplification, Not Selection

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):299-324 (2021)
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We argue that recent empirical findings and theoretical models shed new light on the nature of attention. According to the resulting amplification view, attentional phenomena can be unified at the neural level as the consequence of the amplification of certain input signals of attention-independent perceptual computations. This way of identifying the core realizer of attention evades standard criticisms often raised against sub-personal accounts of attention. Moreover, this approach also reframes our thinking about the function of attention by shifting the focus from the function of selection to the function of amplification.

Author Profiles

Peter Fazekas
University of Antwerp
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp


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