A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1061-1164 (2015)
Abstract
In their article 'Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes', Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl draw upon structural equation models to develop an attractive analysis of 'actual cause'. Their analysis is designed for the case of deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an elegant treatment of probabilistic causation.
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2017
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Archival date: 2017-02-27
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References found in this work BETA
Causality.Pearl, Judea
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.Woodward, James
Causation as Influence.Lewis, David K.
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Citations of this work BETA
Partial Liability.Kaiserman, Alex
Pre-Emption Cases May Support, Not Undermine, the Counterfactual Theory of Causation.Northcott, Robert
On the Explanatory Depth and Pragmatic Value of Coarse-Grained, Probabilistic, Causal Explanations.Kinney, David
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2015-09-07
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87 ( #26,944 of 41,495 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #27,526 of 41,495 )
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