Intentionality, Value Disclosure and Constitution: Stein´s Model

In Elisa Magrì & Dermot Moran (eds.), Empathy, Sociality and Personhood. Essays on Edith Stein´s Phenomenological Investigations. (2018)
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Abstract
This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, The problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein’s main theses about emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature of these grasped values.
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Archival date: 2019-11-12
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