Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification

Synthese (1):641-660 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory.
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2018
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FEROMA-2
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First archival date: 2019-10-21
Latest version: 1 (2019-10-21)
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2018-12-07

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