Socrates versus Eichmann. Thinking and Judging in Hannah Arendt’s Political Philosophy

Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 68 (2023)
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Abstract

This article aims to show the relevance of Hannah Arendt’s political and philosophical thought on the contemporary crisis of “political space”, bureaucratically moralised for the citizens, with a focus on the disorientation of public opinion in state affairs. In her philosophical career, Hannah Arendt investigated the functioning mechanisms of totalitarian regimes and pioneered the famous notion of the “banality of evil”, which she coined during Eichmann trial, held in Jerusalem in 1961. Arendt questions the nature of the evil that was being perpetrated during the Second World War: an evil without a face and without roots, but which had claimed the lives of many people. Arendt reflects on this new type of evil that can be countered through the action of critical thinking. After the war, there was a strong need to redefine an idea of responsibility and a call for each individual to voice their ideas. Put it briefly, post-war society had to become a new philosophical and intellectual arena. Beginning with the strife between state law and moral law, I will include in my discussion Kantian famous notions of categorical imperative and reflective judgment, clarifying their use in Arendt’s conception of thinking and judging. Arendt, recognising Socrates as a critical thinker par excellence, keeps alive a dimension of living in common that protects the individual's singularity and guarantees a conscious and meaningful relationship with the otherness.

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