Can Artificial Intelligence (Re)Define Creativity?

In EthicAI=LABS Project. Sofia: DA LAB Foundation /Goethe-institut Sofia. pp. 34-48 (2022)
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Abstract

What is the essential ingredient of creativity that only humans – and not machines – possess? Can artificial intelligence help refine the notion of creativity by reference to that essential ingredient? How / do we need to redefine our conceptual and legal frameworks for rewarding creativity because of this new qualifying – actually creatively significant – factor? Those are the questions tackled in this essay. The author’s conclusion is that consciousness, experiential states (such as a raw feel of what is like to be creating) and propositional attitudes (such as intention to instigate change by creating) appear pivotal to qualifying an exploratory effort as creativity. Artificial intelligence systems would supposedly be capable of creativity if they could exhibit such states, which philosophers and computer scientists posit as conceptually admissible and practically possible. The existing legal framework rewards creative endeavours by reference to the novelty or originality of the end result. But this bar is not insurmountable for artificial intelligence. Technically speaking, artificial intelligence systems can create works that are novel and/or original. Are we then prepared to grant to those systems the legal status of “creators” in their own right? Whom should the associated benefits and rewards be assigned to? How does the position change (or not) based on the qualifying factors set out above? Should – and if, how – the general public benefit from inventions / creative works of artificial intelligence systems if troves of personal data are the key component that fueled and informed creative choices?

Author's Profile

Dessislava Fessenko
Harvard University

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