Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action

Phronesis 63 (3):229-256 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 229 - 256 I argue that, for Aristotle, akratic actions are against one’s general commitment to act in accordance with one’s correct conception of one’s ends overall. Only some akratic actions are also against one’s correct decision to perform a particular action. This thesis explains Aristotle’s views on impetuous _akrasia_, weak _akrasia_, stubborn opinionated action and inverse _akrasia_. In addition, it sheds light on Aristotle’s account of practical rationality. Rational actions are coherent primarily with one’s commitments to one’s conception of the good and only secondarily with one’s decisions to perform a particular action.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FIEAOT-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-05-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-05-25

Total views
214 ( #23,035 of 54,612 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #15,174 of 54,612 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.