Joint attention in joint action
Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD student in Philosophy at the Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Shaun Gallagher is Lilian and Morrie Moss Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis, USA.
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Archival date: 2013-08-01
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2012-05-29
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2012-05-29
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1,083 ( #3,432 of 57,118 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
102 ( #5,758 of 57,118 )
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