Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability

In B. Brogaard & D. Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 188-212 (2020)
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This paper considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. I defend an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. I show its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explain-ing the phenomenology of duration experiences. I then consider whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. I argue that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between perception and belief that duration perceptions and beliefs do not exhibit. In-stead, the assignment of epistemic features to particular processing stages appears to answer to pragmatic needs, not psychological facts.
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Archival date: 2018-02-09
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