Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability

In B. Brogaard and D. Gatzia (ed.), The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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This paper considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. I defend an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. I show its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explain-ing the phenomenology of duration experiences. I then consider whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. I argue that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between perception and belief that duration perceptions and beliefs do not exhibit. In-stead, the assignment of epistemic features to particular processing stages appears to answer to pragmatic needs, not psychological facts.
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The Modularity of Mind.Cummins, Robert & Fodor, Jerry
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): A Framework for Perception and Action Planning.Hommel, Bernhard; Müsseler, Jochen; Aschersleben, Gisa & Prinz, Wolfgang

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