From AI to Octopi and Back. AI Systems as Responsive and Contested Scaffolds

In Vincent C. Müller, Aliya R. Dewey, Leonard Dung & Guido Löhr (eds.), Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art. Berlin: SpringerNature (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue against the view that existing AI systems can be deemed agents comparably to human beings or other organisms. I especially focus on the criteria of interactivity, autonomy, and adaptivity, provided by the seminal work of Luciano Floridi and José Sanders to determine whether an artificial system can be considered an agent. I argue that the tentacles of octopuses also fit those criteria. However, I argue that octopuses’ tentacles cannot be attributed agency because their behavior can be meaningfully interpreted only in reference to the octopus’ organism as an entire system. I argue that attributing agency to AI systems faces similar difficulties, and propose an alternative characterization of these systems as responsive and contested scaffolds.

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Giacomo Figà-Talamanca
Aachen University of Technology

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